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Abstract
There is a well-developed view of artifacts according to which their nature depends on the
intentions of their authors or creators. However, in the modern world of artifact design
and creation, typically not one but many agents are involved in the process of making an
artifact. In this paper, I showhow the intentional view can bemaintained even for ‘collective’
artifacts havingmultiple authors.My approach is to combine some basic concepts that have
been proposed in the study of collective intentionality with a suitable model of artifact
creation that takes account of the multiple agents and processes that arise in design,
engineering and manufacturing a new or existing product. In this way, we can explain how
an artifactual kind can be understood via a form of collective intentionality. For the design
sciences, notions such as we-intentionality and group agency can help to model different
types of cooperation and, in particular, to reconcile individualism with strong forms of
collectivity at a group level.
Key words: collective intentionality, artifacts, social ontology, philosophy of design and
engineering
1. Introduction
1.1. Artifacts and sociality
The study of artifacts, their creation, their nature and their ontological status is
of growing interest in many fields of inquiry. The process of artifact creation is
not only central to design science but is a flourishing topic in disciplines like
anthropology, social psychology and philosophy.Within philosophy, for example,
metaphysics investigates the very nature of artifactual kinds and studies their
criteria of identity and individuation. Another philosophical direction is one that
takes into account that many man-made objects have a purpose or a technical
function, and so the study of technical functions and the corresponding uses of
artifacts is of concern, notably in the philosophies of design and engineering.
Furthermore, since many artifacts are mass-produced and commercialised, they
form part of our economic systems. This yields a third perspective: the manner in
which artifacts are created and evolve over time is a topic in economics as well as
in studies of technology and innovation.1
1 Artworks are also artifacts, and the philosophy of art is also concerned with ontological issues
of the kind that arise in metaphysics. This yields a fourth perspective that is closely related to
the first. It also throws up links between art and technology, two fields that are traditionally kept
at arm’s length.
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In this paper, I will consider these three perspectives on artifacts in more
detail and discuss some very basic questions of ontology and meaning. More
specifically, I wish to focus on some aspects of artifacts and sociality. The idea that
social contexts are important for understanding artifacts and their development
is certainly not a new one. In technology studies there has been since the 1980s
a prominent sociological approach that aims to analyse the social construction of
technology (Bijker, Hughes & Pinch 1987). One feature of this approach is the idea
that technical artifacts develop in response to problems and issues faced by social
groups that are in some way involved with the artifact.2
In deciding which problems are relevant [for the artifact], the social groups
concerned with the artifact and the meanings that those groups give to the
artifact play a crucial role: a problem is defined as such only when there
is a social group for which it constitutes a ‘problem.’ (Pinch & Bijker 1987,
p. 30)
In the social constructivist approach, therefore, certain collectives figure
prominently in understanding artifacts and the meaning of artifactual terms.
More recently, some followers of this approach even talk of a ‘collectivist’ account
of technological ontology (Schyfter 2009).
As entities embedded within social and cultural systems, artifacts must
be addressed using an analytic framework that incorporates a strong
component of collective artifact sociality, rather than simply individual
intentionality. (Schyfter 2009, p. 18)
Here Pablo Schyfter is emphasising two concepts that will feature strongly in
my discussion: that of sociality and that of intentionality. The latter concept, for
Schyfter, arises through what he calls formative intentional actions.3 These are
actions that are socially situated and form part of the norms of use for a given
artifact, as in the action of a waiter opening a wine bottle in a restaurant that
may show the meaning of the term ‘waiter’s corkscrew’.4 The idea of intentionality
related to norms of use in a social context is important andwewill return to it later
on. However, initially I would like to deal with another aspect, also connected with
use, but more closely linked to design: the intentionality involved in the creation
or making of artifacts, by designers, producers and other stakeholders.
Although he brings together the notions of sociality, collectivity and
intentionality, Schyfter does not develop them further with reference to recent
work in the philosophy of sociality and the area of collective intentionality.
While the idea of social groups and group agency is a very old one, there is a
recent surge of interest in the philosophy of sociality, starting around the same
time as (but independently from) the social constructivist view of technology
in the 1980s (Tuomela 1984; Gilbert 1989). This has led to a lively branch of
inquiry nowadays known as social ontology. It deals with some of the very basic
notions underlying social interaction and social science, such as group agency,
cooperation, collectivity, group beliefs and intentions, social norms, and so on.
2 In today’s jargon user groupsmight be prime examples.
3 Borrowing some ideas from Collins & Kusch (1998).
4 Writers concerned with the functions of technical artifacts have also emphasised the idea that
function ascriptions need to be socially recognised (Hansson 2006).
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A central concern in this work is to explain how collective notions like group
agency, group belief or group intentions are distinct from but emerge out of the
attitudes held by individual agents in a collective.5
While scholars in technology studies, including social constructivists, have
looked at the impact of social groups on artifacts and technology development
in particular cases, to my knowledge they have not examined in a design
and development context fundamental questions about group agency and the
emergence of group attitudes like beliefs and intentions and how these may bear
on the design process. This is the path I would like to explore further here and
in doing so examine and defend the following ideas. The first is that artifacts
are intentional objects or objects having a dual structure, both physical and
intentional. The second claim is that the nature of new artifact types is constituted
by the intentions of the creators and makers of these artifacts. However, there are
two important provisos to this claim.One is that this idea of artifact determination
cannot be reduced to the individual intentions of artifact creators but has an
irreducibly social aspect. To emphasise thiswewill say that it is based on a collective
or we-intentionality. The second caveat is that once a new artifact type has been
introduced its users also form part of this we-intentionality and co-determine the
nature of the artifact. Considered in terms of the meaning of artifactual concepts:
while we can make a formal difference at an individual level between assignments
and attributions ofmeaning, ultimately collective attributions ofmeaning become
stipulative and hence constitutive.
1.2. Artifacts and intentionality
Writing in the latter part of the 19th Century, the philosopher and Jesuit
priest, Franz Brentano, championed the idea that there is a realm of intentional
phenomena not reducible in kind to the physical realm.6 In the 20th Century,
Roman Ingarden was a prominent exponent of the idea that human, cultural
objects are intentional. Ingardenwas a student of two of Brentano’smost illustrious
pupils, Kazimierz Twardowski and Edmund Husserl. As illustrative examples,
Ingarden took the cases of flags and churches that require social or institutional
acts to give them meaning. He also stressed the dual, physical and intentional,
nature of certain forms of art. For example, he referred to the two-layered structure
of architectural works, as intentional artworks on the one hand and as ‘real’
buildings of bricks andmortar, on the other.7Much later on John Searle developed
the idea of social acts conferringmeaning as a central feature of his theory of social
institutions (Searle 1995).
This idea has been extended to artifacts more generally. What we might term
the intentionalist view of artifacts holds that the nature of an artifact or artifactual
kind depends on the intentions of its author or creator.One version of this viewhas
been developed in particular by Risto Hilpinen who has formulated a dependence
5 The interdisciplinary COLLINT series of international conferences on Collective Intentionality
began in 1999 and reached its 9th edition in 2014. Regular conferences on Social Ontology organised
by the European Network on Social Ontology (ENSO) have been held since 2011 and an International
Social Ontology Society (ISOS) was formed in 2012 as well as the Journal of Social Ontology. Besides
mixing disciplines, this community also brings together different philosophical traditions: alongside
analytical philosophy, the phenomenological tradition is well-represented.
6 Especially in Brentano (1874).
7 See in particular Ingarden (1961).
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condition requiring that the existence and some of the properties of an artifact
depend on an author’s intention to make an object of a certain kind.
An object o is an artifact authored by A only if some properties of o depend
on the content of A’s intentions. (Hilpinen 1993, p. 159)
(see also Hilpinen (2011) for a more recent discussion). There is also a related
success condition:
If an object o is an artifact authored by A, there is a sortal description K
such that the existence of o depends on A’s intention to produce an object
of kind K . (Hilpinen 1993, p. 159)8
Stronger or weaker forms of the intentionalist view are obtained by regarding
the dependence condition as applying to few, many or all of the principal features
of an artifact. For example a strong intentionalist view of artifacts has been
propounded by Amie Thomasson who argues that the metaphysical natures of
artifactual kinds are constituted by the concepts and intentions of their authors,
(see especially Thomasson (2003, 2007)).
Thomasson rejects a common view that artifactual kinds are individuated by
means of their function. Her suggestion is that the creator’s intentions form the
most relevant guide to the extension of an artifact type and so artifacts must be
the intended products of human activities. This is not to say that functions cannot
be among the features that the author of an artifact intends it to have. Rather, there
are artifacts such as artworks that need not always be associated with an intended
function, while some artifacts that do possess functional properties need not be
fully determined by those properties (theymay be neither necessary nor sufficient
for that purpose).9,10
A consequence of Thomasson’s view is that, since intentions are constitutive of
meaning, makers (in a very general sense of maker) cannot be completely wrong
about the nature of the artifacts they produce. As with social concepts, beliefs
about artifacts may partly be constitutive of their meaning.
Thomasson defends her view by considering a simplified account of a single,
individual artisan intentionally creating a prototype artifact of a new kind. Since
the object is of a new type, there is no question of her aiming to copy an existing
design or conform to a previously available specification of some product, to
which she could succeed or fail. Instead, the features that are relevant to the new
kind K are those features intentionally given by her. She must have a substantive
idea of what kind of object a K must be, along with the intention to produce
8 For Hilpinen the content of the intention is not the artifact itself but a description – here called ‘sortal
description’ – characterising what type of object is supposed to be created. Notice that since authorship
is part of the concept of artifact, in these references to an author A there is no loss of generality.
9 Working prototypes may share all the essential features of a commercial product yet not be
designed for public consumption. For example at automobile shows like Frankfurt’s IAA it has become
customary for manufacturers to display concept cars. These may be fully working motor vehicles but
nevertheless not designed for public use on the road or track, more often their ‘function’ is to showcase
certain stylistic or technical features such as lightness, aerodynamic form, innovative materials, fuel
economy, and so on. In this case while clearly belonging to the category of motor car they are not
functioning in the same way as the other vehicles on display.
10 Functional views of the nature of artifacts can be found in Millikan (1999) andMcLaughlin (2001).
Vega-Encabo&Lawler (2014) offer a recent critique and comparison of functional versus intentionalist
accounts of the creation of new artifactual kinds.
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that kind of object. By creating a new artifact and delineating a new kind she has
stipulated the features that are relevant for and constitutive of that kind.
As Thomasson remarks, there is an element of ‘self-referentiality’ in artifactual
concepts. It follows that there is not only a natural comparison but also a contrast
with Searle’s view of institutional concepts in Searle (1995).
Whereas for a certain sort of thing to be money, it is necessary (and
sufficient) that it be the sort of thing that is collectively regarded as money,
for an individual object to be a chair, it must itself have been intended to
be a chair. (Thomasson 2007, p. 58)
In recent years, the dual nature of technical artifacts has been highlighted and
studied by a number of scholars working on the philosophical foundations of
design, engineering and technology. From 2000, a research programme entitled
The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts ran for several years coordinated by the
Delft University of Technology in The Netherlands. According to its manifesto,
this programme aims to develop a coherent conceptualisation of technical artifacts
taking into account their dual nature as (i) designed physical structures
which realize (ii) intentionality-bearing functions. 11
A key aspect of the programme was to investigate the nature of (i) and (ii) and
especially their interrelations; this was realised through a substantial output of
research papers and books.12 We will shortly examine one of these works in more
detail.
1.3. Aims and approach
In the modern world of artifact design, creation and manufacturing, typically
many agents will be involved in the process of creating an artifact or indeed
designing and making a new artifactual kind. Both Hilpinen and Thomasson
accept that there may be a plurality of agents involved. In such cases, Hilpinen
(1993) refers to a ‘collective author’ and the item created as a ‘collective
artifact’. The question then arises: what becomes of the intentionalist view?
Does it become indefensible once individual intentionality is no longer relevant?
Recently, Thomasson (2014) has acknowledged the need to go beyond individual
intentionality in understanding artifactual kinds. But while she admits that an
account involving collective intentionality might have plausibility, she is unsure
whether any of the well-known accounts of collective intentionality debated by
philosophers would be appropriate for the task.
There seems to be a hidden challenge here: to develop a suitable account of
artifactual kinds based on a concept of collective intentionality. This will be my
aim in this essay which will argue that the intentionalist view is still defensible
providing individual intentionality is replaced by a suitable form of collective
or we-intentionality. Collective intentionality has become a pivotal concept in
studies of social intelligence. The concept of we-intention was already introduced
and analysed in the works of Wilfred Sellars (e.g., in Sellars (1968)). Later a
11 See Kroes & Meijers (2002).
12 On the nature of technical functions and their ascriptions, see Houkes et al. (2002), Kroes (2010a)
and Kroes (2010b).
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systematic account of we-intentions was given by Tuomela (1984) and developed
into a central concept in his theory of social action.13 More recently, John Searle
has made we-intentionality a vital component in his account of social reality
(Searle 2010).
The path to collective intentionality is inviting, but to pursue this goal we will
need a more sophisticated model of artifact creation: the single-agent, ‘artisan’
model is not cut out to explain how collective intentionality could underlie the
nature of an artifactual kind. A suitable alternative model has been proposed
by two authors contributing to the ‘Dual Nature’ research programme just
mentioned: Wybo Houkes and Pieter Vermaas.14 My arguments for a collective
intentionalist view of artifacts will contain four main steps. First, we will examine
in more detail the Houkes & Vermaas (2009) model of artifact creation. A crucial
feature is that it provides first and foremost an action-theoretic rather than a
functional account of artifacts. Secondly, we will review some of the core ideas of
collective intentionality and in particular take a closer look at Raimo Tuomela’s
analysis of cooperation in the we-mode and show how it can be applied to
the Houkes and Vermaas model. Thirdly, we will examine briefly the notion of
group belief. This is important for understanding how different actors involved
in designing and making artifacts, while possibly entertaining, as individuals,
different ideas (and beliefs) about the nature of the object being created, may
nevertheless establish as a group a coherent, collective view. Fourth, we need to
extend the idea of intentionality to include the broader collective of artifact users.
Once these main ideas are in place, I will discuss an approach to technical
innovation that deals not only with the design and production processes that
follow the concept and product generation phases, but also tries to comprehend
the disruptive phase that precedes the conceptualisation and design of new
products. This approach will also prove useful for our final exercise: to examine
in a very preliminary fashion some issues where concepts from collective
intentionality may bear on practical aspects of the design process.
1.4. Design science and philosophy
Philosophical studies often seem far removed from practical, real-world
considerations. However, if philosophers can provide concepts and ideas that
help us understand the nature of artifacts and artifactual kinds, these ideas should
certainly have ramifications for those involved in designing and creating artifacts.
So, even when focused primarily on conceptual and foundational issues, we can
try to extract some features that might be relevant for design methodology.
What might be the role of philosophy and what kind of contribution can it
make? In our case we are dealing with two different, though related branches
of philosophy. The first is the analytical philosophy of technology and design.
In particular, here we will deal with a semiformal reconstruction of some core
features of the design and production of artifacts. It is a model of artifact
creation centred on the actions and intentions of the different agents involved,
from product-designers to manufacturers and end users. Although inevitably
idealised in many ways, the model comes much closer to modern engineering
practice than the simplified ‘artisanal’ account mentioned earlier. Models of
13 See e.g., by Tuomela & Miller (1985).
14 See especially (Houkes & Vermaas 2004, 2009).
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this kind are useful, not only for the metaphysical analysis of artifacts. In
the philosophy of science, there are many formal and semiformal models that
try to help us understand the structure and growth of scientific knowledge.
Much (though not all) of this knowledge is embodied in descriptive (scientific)
theories and there is a wealth of formal languages and mathematical tools
that can be brought to bear on reconstructing and analysing this knowledge.
Studies of technology and technical innovation have to deal not just with
descriptive (technological) knowledge, but more especially with skills, processes,
goals and actions, embedded in social contexts. Concepts and languages for
describing these features are less well developed than in the case of, say, the
natural sciences. The model of Houkes and Vermaas plays for technology a role
analogous to that played by many formal models in the philosophy of science.
It is a valuable starting point for analysing different aspects of the design and
production process.
Why then do we need to go beyond this engineering model? While the model
considers interactions between the different actors involved in artifact design
and production, it treats beliefs, intentions and actions only at an individual
level. Among the relevant groups of actors only the end users are treated as a
plurality; other agent types are imagined to be single agents even though it is
clear that in practice there will normally be teams of designers, a plurality of
makers, and so on. The model does not seek to represent the relevant agents as
a collective, nor treat them as group agents that may possess group beliefs and
shared intentions. In short, while each of the main design and make stages of
artifact production is carefully characterised in the action-theoretic model, we
are missing an appreciation of how cooperation between actors (of the same or
different agent types) may lead to (and rely upon) group or collective beliefs and
goals.
My view is that adding these missing elements to the engineering model will
strengthen it and increase its explanatory potential. As we noted earlier, the area
of social ontology deals with the relevant notions of group agency, group beliefs
and we-intentionality and provides the concepts we need. It may also suggest
some departures from everyday language. In everyday speech, collectivism is often
contrasted with individualism. ‘Collectivism’ seems to suggest conformity or a
lack of independence, while ‘individualism’ suggests the opposite. However, in
philosophical studies a more nuanced position is often taken. According to this
view, groups may display a strong form of collectivism in terms of their overall
goals and their forms of internal cooperation, while at an individual level group
members may entertain different opinions and beliefs. Despite these differences,
group beliefs and commitments may emerge and be adhered to (by the group,
acting as a group).
Concepts related to group agency are therefore important for several reasons.
For one thing, these notions play an explanatory role in social sciences, aiming
to produce more effective theories than reductionist theories that are based on
individual judgements, preferences, and so forth. Second, group concepts may
help to provide a typology of different forms of cooperation, and these in turn
may be relevant for the understanding of design processes and collective artifacts.
Moreover, these notions bear on practice as well as theory. There are examples
from real-world design and manufacturing, even in mature industries, where
collectivism and individualism co-exist and play equal roles in best practice.
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Concepts like group agency and group attitudes can help to explain how this
co-existence can come about and be successfully managed.15
2. An ‘engineering’ model of artifact creation
Houkes & Vermaas (2004, 2009) have developed an elaborate account of artifacts
that is intended to reflect engineering practice. It involves a detailed model of
agents’ actions, beliefs and intentions in terms of action plans relevant for artifact
design and production. Like Thomasson, they reject the idea that artifacts should
be understood primarily in terms of their functions and they aim to replace the
function-oriented philosophy of artifacts with an account based on intentional
actions.16
There are several reasons to take an interest in the account provided byHoukes
and Vermaas. It aims to reflect modern engineering practice by distinguishing
between design, use and manufacture, as well as between the different actors
involved in these processes. In particular, their account includes a use plan, a
design plan, as well as plans for product-designing, making and manufacturing.
Each of these involves the intentions, goals and beliefs of the specific actors
involved. Not only is this a genuinely multiagent view that aims to reflect
engineering practice, but also, since it is action-theoretic, it can be embedded in
more general theories of social action.
Nevertheless, all is not smooth sailing: there is a major obstacle to overcome
in applying this model in the present context. Houkes and Vermaas themselves
reject the intentionalist stance and claim that their model is incompatible with
views such as those of Thomasson. While they accept the idea ‘that artifacts
are intentionally produced by humans’, Houkes & Vermaas (2009, p. 410), with
explicit reference to Thomasson they question the idea that artifactual kinds can
be identified on the basis ofmakers’ intentions. They also reject her suggestion that
makers can in general be said to have substantively correct ideas about properties
relevant to an artifactual kind. As they say of their own model:
It does not afford a clear relation between the intentions of any of the agents
involved in producing the artifact and membership of an artifact kind.
(Houkes & Vermaas 2009, p. 404)
The main thesis that Houkes and Vermaas attack and Thomasson defends is
therefore the claim:
(A) Artifacts are the intended products of largely successful intentions to
create something of that kind.
While for Houkes and Vermaas the ascription of technical functions to
artifacts plays a role in their model of artifact design and production, functions do
not provide the ‘essences’ of artifacts. Rather, their theory of function ascription
is action oriented and highlights the capacities of artifacts relative to a plan, e.g., a
15 The example of Honda Motor Company will be discussed below.
16 See especially Houkes & Vermaas (2004). In keeping with the aims of the Dual Nature research
programme, Houkes and Vermaas do investigate technical functions, but from this action-theoretic
viewpoint.
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use plan. It is therefore a relative and context-dependent notion based on artifact
actions.17
In their ‘engineering’ model of artifact creation, Houkes andVermaas consider
four agent types: user, designer, maker and manufacturer. A key element in the
model is a use plan, understood as a series of goal-directed actions. Use is then
characterised as the carrying out (by the user) of the actions that make up the use
plan. The designer’s role on the other hand helps users to realise their goals by
constructing and communicating use plans.
To characterise a class of artifacts, three stages of product-designing, making
andmanufacturing are described inmore detail. Behind product-design is the idea
that the designer describes a new item that contributes to the realisation of a use
plan by prospective users of the artifact: as they put it, the designer ‘d intends to
contribute to producing items xi , x j , etc. that do not yet exist by product-designing
them.’
In simplified form, the product-design stage is described as follows (Houkes
& Vermaas 2009, p. 410):
(i) designer d believes that an item x with (physiochemical) capacity ϕ does
not exist.
(ii) d contributes to realising a goal gdx by describing item x (with capacity
ϕ).
(iii) d believes that a composite of components c1, . . . , ci , . . . with capacities
ϕ1, . . . , ϕi , . . . achieves the desired capacity ϕ.
(iv) d believes that the various design tasks gdci are simultaneously fulfilled.
(v) d intends to communicate a description of x (to appropriate agents).
To the extent that some of the components ci may also need to be product-
designed, the first four steps may be iterated for each such ci . This feature is built
into the full description of the model.
The process of making a new artifactual kind is also characterised as a goal-
directed series of actions. InHoukes&Vermaas (2009), this is described as follows:
(i) maker m wants to bring about the existence of item x as described by
agent a who, with that item x , wants to bring about the goal state ga .
(ii) m chooses or constructs a suitable make plan mp.
(iii) m intends to carry out mp (and acts accordingly).
Again, I am simplifying here by omitting some steps at which the maker verifies
whether the plan mp has succeeded. This part of the model distinguishes the
making of x from the agent a who with x wants to bring about the goal state ga .
For example, as Houkes and Vermaas note, agent a may be the product-designer,
while m could be a different engineer involved in the production process.
A third type of agent is the manufacturer who supports all the processes
involve in product creation and delivery. In the model, it is supposed that the
manufacturer designs the make plans that makers use:
(i) manufacturer m f wants to contribute to maker’s goal of bringing about
item x as described by agent a.
(ii) m f constructs a suitable make plan mp involving items y1, y2, . . . .
17 See especially Houkes & Vermaas (2004). They also discuss technical functions in Vermaas &
Houkes (2006).
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(iii) m f contributes to producing y1, y2, . . . .
(iv) m f intends to communicate mp to users.
Once again, this is only a core part of the model. In the full version (Houkes &
Vermaas 2009), consider also processes whereby manufacturers verify and adjust
their make plans in order to arrive at a successful version of the item x .
2.1. Summarising the basic features of the model
If we restrict attention to successful artifact creation, then what we have described
here represents the core features of the Houkes and Vermaas model. Let us
summarise itsmain features. This is amultiagent account comprising several agent
types with specific roles. There is an overarching goal, to design, produce and
use an item x of an artifactual kind, say K , according to certain plans. To reach
this goal there are various subgoals, each with corresponding plans. These may
involve designing and producing the required subcomponents of x , c1, . . . , ci , . . .
assembled according to suitable make plans. The model involves agent beliefs,
about capacities, properties and plans, as well as intentions, to act and carry out
plans. There is also agent communication involved, since for example designers
communicate plans to makers, manufacturers communicate plans to users, and
so forth. We now need to examine whether and how these features may support
an intentionalist understanding of artifacts.
3. A role for collective intentionality
Can we reconcile the view that artifacts are determined by a collective form
of intentionality with the model of artifact creation proposed by Houkes and
Vermaas? They themselves are sceptical about this. They take it to be a key feature
(and improvement) that their model distinguishes between plan-designers,
product-designers, makers and manufacturers. However, even when these agents
act deliberately and their ‘intentions are related to the characteristics of the
produced item’ (Houkes & Vermaas 2009, p. 415), it is claimed that they may
have ‘incomplete or conflicting notions of what is required to create a successful
object of the kind.’ Their reluctance to accept that artifact kinds are collectively
determined by all the agents involved in the design and production process
seems to rest on the doubt that such kinds could ever be said to be collectively
determined (by a group or team) when members of the group display conflicting
conceptions and intentions. This seems to be a primary reason for their rejection
of thesis (A).18
Rather than constituting an argument against collective intentionality, it seems
to me that individual differences in the conceptions held by the key agents in the
design and production process may yield an argument in favour of introducing
collective intentionality into the Houkes and Vermaas model.
3.1. Collective intentionality and cooperation in the we-mode
Collective intentionality and related concepts have been studied by scholars from
different disciplines over a number of years, with increasing vitality since the
18 For argument’s sake, I will assume that teammembersmight individually have different conceptions
about the nature of the kind. In the above quotation, it seems that Houkes and Vermaas’s claim is a
weaker one, that there may be a conflict not over the kind itself but over the means needed to create it.
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early 1990s. Besides John Searle andRaimoTuomelamentioned earlier, influential
writers include Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman.19 The central concept
within Gilbert’s theory is that of joint commitment, while Bratman has focused
especially on understanding shared intentions. While these concepts are formally
distinct and display different social and normative features, as Smith (2015)
argues, they have many similarities and commonalities.20
Like several other scholars, Bratman aims to explicate simple forms of human
sociality (he calls itmodest sociality) and he does so by analysing shared intentions
and joint activities. Typical examples could be singing a duet together, painting a
house together, or going to a football match together. His approach is based on a
planning theory of intention and agency. For Bratman, shared intentions are based
on joint activities and in his words involve:
(i) intentions on the part of each [actor] in favor of the joint activity,
(ii) intentions on the part of each in favor of the joint activity byway of the
intentions of each in (i) and by way of relevant mutual responsiveness
in subintention and action,
(iii) intentions on the part of each in favor of the joint activity by way of
meshing subplans of the intentions of each in (i),
(iv) beliefs of each that, if the intentions of each in (i) persist, the
participants will perform the joint activity by way of those intentions
and relevant mutual responsiveness in subintention and action,
(v) beliefs of each that the intentions of each in (i) are persistence
interdependent,
(vi) the intentions of each in (i) are persistence interdependent, and
(vii) common knowledge of (i)–(vii). (Bratman 2014, pp. 85–86.)
Here, the idea of persistence interdependence of an intention is that each agent
continues to intend so long as the other does so and there is mutual knowledge
of this. I do not wish to dig deeper into the details of Bratman’s theory of shared
agency. I mention it since it is a well-received view in the area of social ontology
and because even this very brief summary suggests obvious connections we can
make to the artifact creation model. Both involve plans, intentions, actions and
activities in an essential way and it seems clear that in the Houkes and Vermaas
model, some of these activities as well as the intentions in their favour must be
jointly shared by the relevant actors. In both cases, there are also subplans and
there is appropriate communication between actors (explicit in the Houkes and
Vermaas model and implicit in Bratman’s summary just quoted).
While Bratman, like Gilbert and others, provides valuable insights, the theory
of joint action and shared intention described in Bratman (2014) restricts
attention to shared actions within stable groups where there are no asymmetrical
authority relations. Strictly speaking, his theory could be applied to the actors
and processes involved in artifact design and production only if there is a flat,
nonhierarchical organisational structure. Since this is not normally the case, for
our purposes it will be convenient to look closer at an alternative approach
19 Especially (Gilbert 1989) and the essays collected in Bratman (1999).
20 For their most recent formulations, see Gilbert (2013) and Bratman (2014).
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to collective intentionality, for example, that taken by Raimo Tuomela (I’ll use
especially Tuomela (2007)).
In Tuomela’s account, the core concepts of collective intentionality are joint
intentions and social actions, group attitudes and cooperation. Fundamental
to this is his important distinction between the I-mode and the we-mode in
forming intentions and in cooperating to achieve goals. It is the sharing of goals
and cooperation in the we-mode that helps distinguish a form of collective
intentionality that is not reducible to individual intentions as represented in the
I-mode. Very roughly put, the difference is that in the I-mode an agent, even
if acting within a group or collective, is acting in her own interests, while in
the we-mode agents are acting in the interests of the group as a whole and are
committed to certain group goals or intentions.
The Houkes and Vermaas model of artifacts incorporates action, agency and
a plurality of agents, and so is precisely of the right kind for analysing within
Tuomela’s framework under the we-mode of intention and cooperation. As we
have seen it is a multiagent model of cooperation and there are explicit and
common goals, communication between agents and even shared plans to achieve
goals.
Here is Tuomela’s formal account of cooperation in the we-mode, given for the
simplified case of two agents, A1 and A2 (the embedded condition (AT ∗) will be
explained below):
A1 and A2 (successfully) cooperate with each other in the we-mode in
bringing about a goal G if and only if
(1) G is a collective goal type, namely an ‘achievement-whole’ the
achievement of which can be divided – either ex ante actu or ex post
actu – into A1’s and A2’s parts;
(2) A1 and A2 jointly intend to achieve G by acting jointly in the sense
of (AT ∗), and they achieve G jointly in accordance with and partly
because of this joint intention of their to achieveG together. (Tuomela
2007, p. 165.)
This is Tuomela’s ‘conceptually minimal’ notion of a we-mode cooperation. It is
further embellished to a ‘weakly rational’ form of cooperation by requiring, in
addition, that A1 and A2 rationally believe (1) and (2), and that (2) holds in part
because of this shared belief.
To understand this account of cooperation, we need to clarify an underlying
property of joint action on which it depends. This relies on the further condition
(AT ∗) explained by Tuomela as follows. X is jointly performed (by two agents
‘you’ and ‘I’) if
(1) X is a collective action type, that is, an ‘achievement-whole’ divisible
– either ex ante actu or ex post actu – into your and my parts;
(2) we jointly intended to perform X jointly;
(3) we performed X jointly in accordance with and partly because of our
joint intention to perform X (or some ‘closely related’ action) jointly;
(4) you and I mutually believed – or at least shared the belief – that 1, 2,
and 3;
(5) 2 in part because of 4. (Tuomela 2007, p. 112.)
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In short, that agents acted jointly in the sense of (AT ∗) means that there was a
joint intention to perform the action of a certain type X and that the performance
of X was in accordance with a joint intention to perform X . Moreover, there is
mutual belief about this among the agents concerned.
Without going into all the subtleties of joint actions and collective goals as
analysed by Tuomela (2007), we can nevertheless make the following suggestions.
First, suppose that a collective goal type G is the goal to produce an item x of
an artifact type K and let us suppose that this goal succeeds and x is produced.
The agents involved in the cooperation to achieve G may include the product-
designers, makers and manufacturers, each with roles as described in the account
of Houkes and Vermaas. They design, communicate and carry out plans. These
agents cooperate in the we-mode since they jointly intend to achieve G by acting
jointly in the sense of Tuomela’s joint action account; each agent ai performing
according to its appropriate role type. This cooperation involves the mutual belief
that they so intend. The various subgoals, say g1, . . . gi , . . . involving components
c1, . . . ci , . . . are similarly achieved via joint actions and cooperation in the
we-mode.
Both models refer to what is eventually a successful form of cooperation, since
ultimately an artifact of type K is produced. Having G as a collective goal type
means in this case that there is a shared commitment to produce an artifact of
type K and that the agents involved are thus acting as a group. By saying that ‘the
production of an artifact of type K ’ is a shared goal, and referring to ‘K ’ in this
statement, we are not begging the question about collective intentionality. We are
supposing that an artifact is successfully produced, that this did not come about by
accident, but by design, and that a group effort was involved in this. As we saw, the
Houkes and Vermaas model refers to ‘an item x ’ in several different places. So in
the main goal (and its subgoals) it is clear that the same item x is being described
in each case.21
The Houkes and Vermaas model clearly conforms to the first part of the
we-mode cooperation model since it divides the achievement of the goal into
the different agents’ parts and moreover there is even a sharing of subgoals. We
have just seen this in the examples of the maker’s and manufacturer’s intentions
described earlier. Another example arises in the description of design plans found
in Houkes & Vermaas (2009) that we did not examine in detail. For example, in
clause D1 of their design plan one finds the following condition:
The designer d wants to contribute to a user’s goal of bringing about a
state gu . (Houkes & Vermaas 2009, p. 406)
So here, gu forms part of a use plan and is a goal shared by both agents.22
What is the nature of the collective intentionality surrounding the artifactual
kind K ? The key to understanding this is to see that it rests on shared intentions to
carry out joint plans according to an agreed assignment of roles. It does not rest on
the assumption that agents have mutual beliefs about K or perhaps shared mental
21 It seems clear, then, that within the Houkes and Vermaas model we can legitimately maintain that
there is a common goal G even if there are differences of opinion about K (or item x) within the team
of producers. But if necessary we could replace the expression ‘artifact of type K ’ by an expression such
as ‘an artifact of the type later marketed under the label ‘K ’ ’ or some equivalent formulation.
22 Again, depending on the complexities of the example, presumably gu could be the overall goal G
or merely one of several subgoals.
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models of item x . This is a very fundamental point. Tuomela’s cooperation model
and the action performance submodel do not specifically refer to other attitudes
like first-order beliefs about K . The mutual beliefs in the we-mode cooperation
model are higher-level beliefs about group cooperation, action types etc., not
lower-level beliefs about the nature of K . They refer to the fact that agents assume
that other agents are acting in a cooperative manner and indeed this seems to be
a clear feature of the Houkes and Vermaas model. In our case, they do not need
to share (first-order) beliefs about K . This point is crucial for understanding (and
obviating) Houkes and Vermaas’s objections to the intentionalist view of artifacts.
The classical, textbook account of teamwork in design appears to support our
picture of we-mode cooperation. Here is a typical statement, taken from David
Ullman’s standard text on the mechanical design process:
Modern design problems require a design team – a small number of people
with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose,
common performance goals, and a common approach for which they hold
themselves mutually accountable. (Ullman 2010, p. 67)
On the other hand, when Houkes and Vermaas consider the question whether
product-designers, manufacturers and makers might collectively determine
artifact kinds, they raise a strong doubt by noting that the actors involved may
disagree on certain matters:
. . . the literature on engineering teamwork shows that conflicting
conceptions and intentions among participants often survive intensive
teamwork. (Houkes & Vermaas 2009, p. 417)
Indeed, we might say that without disagreements most innovation would
be stymied. In a corporate climate of ‘yes-men’, there would be no room for
innovative ideas challenging current thinking to emerge bottom-up. This would
be the antithesis of the approach of corporations such as Honda Motor Company
that makes use of a type of meeting, known as waigaya, that aims to improve
any aspect of the design and manufacturing (or sales and marketing) processes
through a thorough and possibly lengthy discussion among different actors. In
waigaya, few or many employees from different departments and responsibilities
meet to discuss a given issue or problem. Such meetings may be held regularly for
days or even years until an agreed proposal or solution is found. In keeping with
the ‘flat’ hierarchical structure at Honda, participants in a waigaya carry equal
weight in their opinions. Ideas generated and results of the discussions become
corporate property, and at the end of waigaya a set of corporate decisions and
plans for enacting are generated.
According to JeffreyRothfeder (see Rothfeder (2014, Ch. 3)),waigayaproceeds
according to four basic rules:
(1) Everybody is equal in waigaya – there are no bad ideas except those
that are not aired.
(2) All ideas must be disputed and rejected until they are either proven
valid or vanquished.
(3) When a person shares an idea, he or she doesn’t own it anymore – it
belongs to Honda and the group can do with it what it will.
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(4) At the end of waigaya, decisions and responsibilities are generated –
a precise list of who is to do what next and by when. (Rothfeder 2014,
pp. 69–70.)
What the example of waigaya illustrates is how from differing conceptions an
agreed plan may emerge – by whatever discussion process that happened to take
place – that the team then has to adhere to. It is instructive to note that ideas, once
aired, are no longer ‘owned’ by the person who raised them. Let us now explore
this idea a little further.
4. Group agency and group beliefs
I mentioned earlier that we would still need a third step on the way to justifying
our collective intentionalist view of artifactual kinds. The reason is that while in
Toumela’s model the shared beliefs are in the form of assumptions about other
agents’ intentions to perform jointly, in the account of Houkes and Vermaas some
first-order beliefs – about the kind K or the object x being made – do explicitly
arise, e.g., at the design and make stages, and these beliefs are communicated
between agents. For instance they may be beliefs about x and its properties, or
about components of x , or the correctness of their make plans, and so on. Since
any of these beliefs might be disputed by members of the design team or by
other stakeholders at different stages of the design and production process, we
need to accommodate such potential differences of opinion within our picture of
we-intentionality.
Let us turn first to the idea of group agency. The notion of group agency
has its roots in antiquity and has been studied by philosophers, sociologists,
legal theorists and psychologists since the 19th Century. Different theories of
group agency have been popular at different times. At opposing extremes there
is the emergentist tradition from legal and social theory that flourished in the
19th Century versus the view of methodological individualism that gained many
adherents in economics and analytical philosophy from the mid-20th Century
onwards.23 The strong emergentist tradition is usually associatedwith theGerman
legal and social historian Otto von Gierke and asserts the reality of social groups
and group agents as entities having a life and mind of their own (von Gierke
1950). This may be contrasted with the strongly reductionist view, popular in
neoclassical economics and game theory, according to which social phenomena
in general and group behaviour in particular can be fully understood in terms of
individual agents. There are many intermediate views of group agency. Recently
we have witnessed a strong social turn in many disciplines, from philosophy to
computer science, in which group agency and group attitudes are treated as fully
legitimate objects of study with explanatory power in the social sciences, but
without necessarily adopting the ‘animationist’ view of earlier times.24 Aside from
philosophical work in the area of social ontology, there are notable contributions
23 Here I follow the terminology from List & Pettit (2011) who also provide a discussion and
comparison of the main schools of thought.
24 Nevertheless today there is a growing body of work on different forms of extended and distributed
cognition; see Miłkowski (2013). Among intermediate positions on group agency, List and Pettit claim
to support a form of methodological individualism, but without reductionism (List & Pettit 2011).
On the other hand Tuomela’s position is emergentist but without animationist or supra-individualist
elements (Tuomela 2013).
15/28
from social choice theory and political science (List & Pettit 2011), from game
theory and economics (Bacharach 2006; Gold & Sugden 2007; Sugden 2015), and
from social psychology (Colman, Pulford, & Lawrence 2014). A strong element of
these studies is the aim to understand both in theory and in practice how agents
belonging to a group or team may form judgements and reason about them by
putting the interests of the group above their own individual preferences.
Just as there are different types of group and group agency, so the study of
group agents takes different forms. Tuomela, for example, is mainly concerned
with the we-mode form of group participation. In these situations wemay assume
that group beliefs and intentions are reached bymutual agreement and consensus.
By contrast (List & Pettit 2011) are primarily interested in groups wheremembers’
involvement is of the I-mode sort. 25 In this case groupmembers reach opinions in
their own interests, and group beliefs and intentions are supposed to be obtained
via some process of judgement aggregation, based on voting or otherwise. List
& Pettit (2011) discuss different types of criteria to ensure the rationality of
the resulting group beliefs. Therefore, while the approaches of Bratman, Gilbert
and Tuomela are mainly descriptive in kind, the focus of List & Pettit (2011) is
primarily prescriptive.26 Which kind of group agency would apply in modern
corporations? That again depends on the context as well as the corporation
involved. Where committee or boardroom decisions are reached by some form
of voting or other aggregation procedure, different personal opinions might be
expressed by members, without the need for full consensus. On the other hand,
as the example of waigaya illustrates there are clearly forms of teamwork present
even in large corporations where consensus and group decisions emerge not by
some aggregation of individual views but by painstaking discussion and debate.
A key point to grasp is that even on these differing accounts of group beliefs,
in both cases it is a well established view that such beliefs are not necessarily
held individually by every member of a given collective, or even by a majority
of members.27 In the Houkes and Vermaas model we need not assume that the
beliefs and conceptions communicated between the relevant agents are shared by
all actors individually. They can be either individual beliefs that are communicated
between actors or (in the important cases) group beliefs when they are taken up
by a team as a whole. In Tuomela’s own approach, for example, group beliefs are
understood to involve an intentional joint acceptance and commitment on the
part of certain group members, but they need not be mutually held by all of the
agents in the group. And this is very likely to be the case within a corporation and
its operative teams.28
Therefore, in the case where the plans for cooperating and achieving the goal
type rely necessarily on specific beliefs (about the nature of an artifactual kind K )
i.e., on conceptions of K , it is sufficient if these are group beliefs, the important
25 To apply Tuomela’s terminology. Tuomela nowadays also uses the concept of pro-group I-mode
which would be appropriate here.
26 We may note however that Bratman and Gilbert in particular do discuss norms and commitments
associated with shared intentions. Given the differences mentioned, group agency in the sense of
Bratman and Tuomela applies well to many forms of team work and collaboration, while the ideas
developed in List & Pettit (2011) apply more especially to groups where certain kinds of decision-
making are involved, such as in committees, or cases where different expert opinions need to be
averaged.
27 Unlike in the case of common and shared beliefs.
28 For Tuomela’s account see for instance Tuomela (1992) and Tuomela (2007). For a recent discussion
of different approaches to group belief and a formal analysis of this notion, see Gaudou et al. (2015).
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feature being that they are not necessarily held by each agent individually (though
they may be communicated and acted upon). Another point to observe is that not
all agents involved in a production process need be cooperating in the we-mode.
While in modern forms of production, technicians and assembly-line workers are
usually highly ‘integrated’ into the production process and aware of their role in
the manufacturing the final product, we can allow for the case of an assembly-line
worker who acts only in the I-mode in Tuomela’s sense. We can leave room for
this while holding that those agents who are essentially responsible for the final
outcome are cooperating in the we-mode.
As quoted earlier, Houkes and Vermaas suggest that conflicting conceptions
and even intentions among participants ‘often survive intensive teamwork.’ If true,
we would have to analyse whether these are disagreements at an individual level
that need not affect group judgements and policies or whether they are so far-
reaching as to threaten the integrity of group decisions and actions. What we can
observe here is that the engineering model we have been discussing presupposes
that an artifact is successfully produced.29 And this suggests that at the group
level of cooperation and action the we-mode form is stronger. In particular, the
I-mode form of cooperation does not seem to explain how a new artifact type
could successfully be produced. In the I-mode, while cooperation between agents
is possible, typically joint goals, collective actions and group attitudes are missing.
This scarcely seems adequate to explain how the outcomes of modern design and
production processes can be so effective.
It might seem at first counterintuitive to claim that the nature of an artifactual
kind K depends on a form of collective intentionality, while the actors involved
may hold differing conceptions of K . This might indeed appear strange if one is
thinking that the ‘essence’ of K is collectively determined by some mutual idea, a
shared mental model or perhaps an agreed list of technical functions and defining
properties. But this is not the case under the multiagent, action-theoretic model
of artifact creation. In this model the ‘nature’ of K depends on the plans that the
agents enact under (I claim) a we-intentional form of cooperation. Those beliefs
that support different phases of artifact creation, inasmuch as they are beliefs
about the nature of K , should be regarded as group beliefs to which coremembers
of the team are committed as a group in order to pursue the overarching goal. If
this is correct, then production of an artifact in the manner envisaged by Houkes
and Vermaas can illustrate an elaborate form of cooperation in the we-mode,
with common goals and group commitments, and therefore exhibit exemplary
features of collective intentionality. If those essentially involved in the design and
production process act as a team, then their group commitments, attitudes and
goals are what help to ensure the successful outcome. Moreover, the notion of
we-mode and the appeal to collective intentionality and group attitudes helps to
explain how a coherent artifactual type K may be successfully established even if
different beliefs and conceptions about K are held by individual team members.
5. Users
In moving from individual to collective intentionality up to now we have focused
more on the roles of the professional actors (designers, engineers, manufacturers,
. . .). However end users are also very much present in the model proposed
29 And if it is a new artifactual kind presumably that it is successfully introduced to market.
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by Houkes and Vermaas. As we saw, use plans are a central feature of this
model. Houkes & Vermaas (2004) make it clear that these are not only created
by designers, but also by ordinary end users. They distinguish between standard
use that accords with a traditional or designed plan, and non-standard use that
follows a different plan, devised by the user or by other users. In the latter case the
actors involved may be redesigners or innovative users who have produced new
plans for a pre-existing artifact.
Contemporary approaches to design and technical innovation tend to lay a
greater emphasis on the consumer and end user. This is evident in the paradigm
of human-centred design that has now become well established. Among the
key principles of human-centred design (as defined in an ISO (2010) standard
document) is the involvement of users throughout design and development, that
the evaluation of design is user-centred, that this is an iterative process and there
is consideration of the whole user experience. This leads naturally to the idea of
the consumer as co-designer. Some recent economic studies of innovation have
drawn attention to the concept of the consumer-innovator and the considerable
extent to which this is already featuring in developed economies (von Hippel
2005; von Hippel, Ogawa & de Jong 2011). In this case, it is not merely that
the consumer forms part of design evaluation, it is that the (non-professional)
consumer is actually inventing and designing new items some of which are taken
up as new commercial products. VonHippel emphasises not only the large number
of user-innovators but also the increasing availability of tools, platforms and
support for co-design and development. A classical example is the open software
movement, but there are also many other examples, from manufacturing as well
as from service industries.30
Some writers go as far to suggest that co-design, and what is coming to be
known as co-creation, are radically changing the role of the designer and form
part of a general transition towards a non-consumerist society. Sanders & Stappers
(2008) develop this view at length and suggest that it is bringing about a change
in focus from the designing of products to the designing for purposes such as for
emotion, experiencing, sustainability, and so forth.On their account, while there is
a (changing) role for the professional designer, the traditional distinctions between
designer, research and consumer need to be reconfigured.
Whatever view one takes of the design process, it seems clear that the nature
of an artifactual kind is to some degree co-determined by its end uses and thus
by its end users. This much is now conceded by Amie Thomasson. Having
previously insisted on individual intentions as kind-determining, she has recently
stated.
I have begun to think [. . .] that there is an important and revealing sense
in which members of public artifact kinds do depend on intentional states
beyond those of theirmakers. The need for individual intentions alone does
not seem to fully capture what it is to be a member of one of our standard,
30 Another good example is provided by the phenomenon of Apps, launched by Apple Inc. in 2008.
Here is a paradigmatic case where users and consumers can invent and even develop and sell new
artifacts precisely due to the fact that a large corporation has provided the technical and commercial
framework (devices, operating systems, contractual schemes) to support this.Moreover, in this way the
corporation in turn lets innovative users drive the technological development of the products (devices,
software) that support these artifacts by showing what new kinds of functionalities the original devices
may have now and in the future.
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extant artifact kinds: what it is to be a table, a teapot, or a salad fork.
(Thomasson 2014, p. 55)31
Thomasson’s approach is now to analyse this collective feature of kind
determination in terms of public norms, in general they are norms of use to
which the artifact is intended to be subject. Though less specific, these norms are
reminiscent of the formative intentional actions discussed by Schyfter that wemet
in the introduction.
With some adjustments in detail I think the model of Houkes and Vermaas
can account for aspects of human-centred design and even co-design, where
engineering and manufacturing are involved. If so, we may think of end users as
part of the design and production process and therefore as part of the group or
collective view of the artifactual kind. This represents a very broad (though not
all-encompassing) version of collective intentionality.
6. Group attitudes and innovation
Another kind of viewpoint emergeswhen the dynamics of artifact creation is taken
fully into account, as for instance in theories of innovation. While the perspective
of the philosophy of design and engineering that we have been considering treats
actions, processes and multiple agents, it does not aim to cover all aspects of
novelty and innovation. The starting points of the Houkes and Vermaas model
are a use plan and a designer’s goal to contribute to producing a certain item that
in a sense conforms to the use plan. In other words, on this model, even if the item
in question is an instance of a new artifactual kind, there is already present a basic
concept of what should be produced andwhat its functionalities should be. Agents
involved in the production process come to agree on, or at least act in agreement
with, joint plans to achieve common goals. It is obvious that this model does not
aim to explain what goes on before use plans and designer goals are fully formed;
in other words what actions, beliefs, decisions or processes lead up to the initial
design intention.
We have seen that makers’ intentions, even in a collective sense, do not
fully determine an artifactual kind; there is usually a degree of uncertainty
and underdetermination. The economist David Lane refers to this feature
as ontological uncertainty and identifies it as a key element in a theory of
innovation.32 For Lane, uncertainty is a broad concept. It includes on the one
hand semantic uncertainty about attributions of functionalities to artifacts: a key
feature of innovation consists in attributing new functionalities to existing objects
or kinds. On the other hand, it also includes (and this is a main component in
the ontological case) uncertainties that actors face in their conceptions of the
world, in their interactions with other actors and in the manner in which modes
of interactionmay change in the future. In short, what Lane describes is a complex
system with many interacting components whose behaviour cannot be predicted
in a deterministic fashion.
According to Lane & Maxfield (2005), a theory of innovation cannot deliver
a predictive theory of technological change; but it can provide a conceptual
framework in which episodes of innovation and technical change can be analysed
31 A ‘public’ artifact for Thomasson (2014) is any member of ‘familiar, recognized, public artifactual
kinds: things like forks, computers, cars, statues, clothes, and the like.’ (p. 46)
32 See Lane (2010) and especially Lane & Maxfield (2005).
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and understood. This conceptual framework or general ontology includes a
number of distinctive features and technical terms. Like many approaches to
complex systems, it is based on an organisational view and an analysis of
organisational structures, in this case structures such as the so-called agent–
artifact space, the generative relationships between agents, as well as commercial
markets. A prominent concept in Lane and Maxfield’s model is that of narrative
and narrative structure. The idea is that agents’ actions are embedded in a
narrative structure that they themselves use to interpret and explain their own
and other agents’ actions and to give coherence to their concepts. Understanding
episodes of innovation and technical change thus involves understanding the
relevant narrative structures and communities of actors as well as unravelling
the narratives or stories of the leading protagonists. Naturally, this process itself
involves piecing together a story.
Complexity and innovation are also explored in Lane (2010) where, in
particular, a dynamic of positive feedback is described. This applies to innovations
where there are attributions of new functionalities to artifacts. A key element in
this process is that relevant organisational structures are also transformed. The
general pattern is described in this way:
(1) New artifact types are designed to achieve some particular attribution
of functionality.
(2) Organisational transformations are constructed to proliferate the use
of tokens of the new type.
(3) Novel patterns of human interaction emerge around these artifacts in
use.
(4) New attributions of functionality are generated – by participants or
observers – to describe what the participants in these interactions are
obtaining or might obtain from them.
(5) New artifacts are conceived and designed to instantiate the new
attributed functionality. (Lane 201033.)
At first sight this is a very different picture of artifact creation from the
action-theoretic account of cooperating agents provided by Houkes and Vermaas.
Where the latter describes joint plans and agreed goals, Lane and his co-authors
describe a complex, dynamical system with competing actors, conflicting views
and goals, and uncertain outcomes. Innovation in creating or changing artifacts
involves changes to the generative relations between agents, and new patterns
of interaction are formed in the organisational structures. It is interesting to
note that Lane’s approach is not tied to modern engineering or high-technology
sectors; it also takes into account episodes that are closer to the artisan model
of artifact creation. For example, while Lane & Maxfield (2005) provides a
case study from modern developments in distributed control technology for
buildings, in Lane (2010) the development of printing from the 15th Century is
examined.
Nonetheless, there are several features that the two accounts share that are
important from my point of view. One is the idea that meaning is determined
by use, and in Lane and Maxfield’s case it is clear that new functionalities
emerge through use and lead to further innovations. Another is the emphasis
33 Lane calls this process 1–5 exaptive bootstrapping. ‘Exaptation’ conveys the idea that an artifactual
kind may embrace new functionalities and patterns of use. This term is now often used by writers on
artifacts. ‘Bootstrapping’ refers to the fact that phase 5 finishes where 1 begins.
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on actions and processes, the actors involved in them and their interactions.
Where the two models differ is their focus on different stages in artifact creation
and production. In Lane’s pattern of exaptive bootstrapping cited above, we
can see that Houkes and Vermaas’s model can be applied at stages 1 and 5,
while the main thrust of Lane’s account is directed at the disruptive stages 2–4.
A positive feature of the account is that innovation does not proceed along a
preset path or a technological trajectory, there are no technological guideposts
or paradigms. Can we also reconcile this feature with the collective intentionality
account of artifacts described earlier? Aswe have seen,making a theory of artifacts
and function ascriptions action-theoretic does not prevent it from embracing
collective intentionality. The Lane and Maxfield account considers varied forms
of agent interaction and cooperation, and also conflicts. Some of the cooperative
features may count as being of the we-mode variety, some perhaps as I-mode;
while shared narrative structuresmay suggest weaker forms of agreement between
actors. My suggestion is that the model of Houkes and Vermaas can be seen as
a way to understand what collective intentionality consists in and how it brings
about the creation of an artifact or artifactual kinds. On the other hand, the
approach of Lane and Maxfield aims to understand how new agreements come
about and collective intentionality may be reconfigured as a result of social and
other changes to the system. Each of these aspects plays an important role in a
theory of artifacts.
7. Group agency and design
I have argued that we-intentionality is compatible with the multiagent, action-
theoretic model of artifact creation and that we should add this feature to
the Houkes and Vermaas account. How does this bear on practical aspects of
the design process? A number of questions comes to mind. For example, one
might ask whether we-mode intentionality may come in degrees. Whether full
we-intentionality is always desirable or whether there are cases where it should be
avoided. Is it a feature that can be controlled by organisations? In view of Houkes
and Vermaas’s concern about lingering differences surviving teamwork, we may
also inquire as to what kinds of conflicts and disagreements may arise in practice
and to what extent they are compatible with we-intentionality. To fully answer
such questions, we would need to enter into specific domains of artifact design
and production. Here, I make only some general remarks.
First, on Tuomela’s account, the we-mode and I-mode are mutually exclusive
forms. Apart from borderline cases, agents are either cooperating in the stronger
we-mode, or they are not. However, for larger groups, there is evidently a trivial
sense in which they could exhibit degrees of we-intentionality depending on
whether a greater or lesser proportion of theirmembers are acting in thewe-mode.
In Tuomela’s case, it seems we would only attribute group agency to collectives
where the form of cooperation is predominantly we-mode, while for group agency
in the sense of List and Pettit an I-mode formof participationwould suffice. In this
latter sense, it is rather obvious that the type and structure of group agents can be
designed and controlled, as List & Pettit (2011) explore in depth. But what about
we-intentionality, are there also ways and occasions in which it can be promoted
and controlled? To deal with this issue, let us return to David Lane’s account and
also to the case of Honda Motor Co. that we discussed earlier.
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7.1. Conditions for intentionality?
In the model presented by Houkes and Vermaas, we do not ask how the various
forms of communication and cooperation between agents come about; they are
simply present and largely taken for granted. To look further into their origins
we should step outside this model and look closer at the transition stages leading
up to the creation of new artifacts. To this end, let us reconsider David Lane’s
analysis of innovation that complements the Houkes and Vermaas account. It is
worth remarking that this approach to understanding innovation not only aims
at describing episodes of change, but it also offers a framework for promoting
and controlling innovation; one that has been tried and tested in large-scale,
collaborative projects.34
At first sight, Lane’s approach might not seem to mesh well with the idea
of we-intentionality as we have portrayed it so far. Indeed, since parts of this
transition phase are clearly disruptive, it breaks with we-intentionality in some
respects. However, if we look closer into the ingredients that according to Lane
and Maxfield are essential to promote generativeness and hence innovation, we
can find several types of conditions that could and should also foster collectivity
(Lane & Maxfield 2005).
A first suggestion is that the activities of agents should have a common
orientation in the agent–artifact space. This may, for instance, mean that different
actors are focusing their attention on the same kind of artifact, though possibly
from different viewpoints. Lane andMaxfield call this notion aligned directedness.
A related idea is called mutual directedness and refers to agents’ abilities to seek
each other out and create new relationships through recurring interactions; it
is acknowledged that trust could play a key role in this. Third, an environment
needs to be created in which there is freedom to communicate, whether among
equals or between subordinates and superiors in a hierarchical structure; this is
termed appropriate permissions. Fourth, there is the idea of action opportunities.
This refers to the ability to undertake joint actions among agents that may reveal
and foster new competences. All of these attributes could be regarded not only as
preconditions for generative relations leading to innovation but also as beneficial
for establishing and maintaining cooperation in the we-mode at the moment
when innovation is taking place and new artifacts are being conceived. There
is a fifth precondition in Lane & Maxfield (2005): heterogeneity. This refers to
the agents concerned displaying different skills and expertise, or having access
to different artifacts, and being willing to try to bridge gaps and combine different
competences. It is not a necessary condition for we-intentionality but it may be an
important ingredient in successful teamwork.
What we can observe from accounts like those of Lane and Maxfield is
that there are transition phases where established relations and cooperations are
broken and new generative relations are forged. However, the conditions that
foster and promote these transitions are also conditions that help to cement new
cooperations and new group alignments.
In his account of attitudes at Honda, Jeffrey Rothfeder emphasises that there is
a corporate culture praising individualism and nonconformism. It is also made
34 For example, Lane’s approach to innovation dynamics features prominently in the project INSITE
(Innovation, Sustainability, Technology) http://www.insiteproject.org/ (European Commission FP7
project 271574) and especially inMD (Emergence by Design, see http://www.emergencebydesign.org)
that focused on how to design for innovation and sustainability in social contexts.
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clear that teams working in a waigaya are typically heterogeneous, involving
professionals from diverse backgrounds. But note that while waigaya encourages
a plurality of individual ideas at the lower level, and thinking out of the box, etc.,
the process is designed to ferment the we-mode participation at the higher level:
ideas and solutions belong to the group, there is a strong commitment to the shared
ethos, an action plan is agreed as a group, and so on. Rothfeder also stresses that
Honda’s approach is not ‘design by committee’ and that waigaya does not achieve
consensus by compromise.
Once again let us repeat that we-intentionality does not mean collectivity at all
levels.
It seems so rational and fundamental that groups of peers working together
toward a common goal should be encouraged, as most large and small
businesses do. But Honda views collaboration from the vantage point of
the individual, not the team . . . . Honda’s belief is that the organizational
structuremust serve tomaximize the aptitude and skills of each individual;
in turn, the team, the organization, will benefit. (Rothfeder 2014, p. 133)
In my view, the example of Honda shows how ‘higher-level’ collectivity (group
agency and we-mode intentionality) is compatible with individual attitudes at the
lower level, where nonconformism is rewarded. Moreover, concepts like I-mode
and we-mode attitudes from social ontology help to explain how collectivity and
individualism can co-exist and support innovation in design and production.35
7.2. Meaning and use
Let us return to our earlier question about conflicts in design teams. What kinds
of conflicts need to be resolved and which ones are likely to be unproblematic?
I think the general answer lies in the Houkes and Vermaas model together with
those concepts from social ontology that we have introduced. Themodel describes
the stable part of the design andmake processes and anchors the nature of artifacts
and hence the meaning of artifactual kinds in terms of use. There are plans for
end use but also plans for intermediate steps in production. When conflicts are
so strong that they break the we-mode attitude of individuals, the collective may
no longer function as a group agent. So there will not be a group commitment
to adhere to agreed plans, goals etc. Thus, if we are thinking of the Houkes and
Vermaas model, then what is at stake is the integrity of the design, use and make
plans. Note, however, that we would not say in practice that very small changes in
a design or use plan always constitute a change of artifact. And in practical terms
there may be different manufacturing processes that lead to essentially the same
artifact. Moreover, as has been pointed out, the kind is underdetermined by its
use plan, since new uses may be found and even encouraged in practice. So this
means that very similar artifacts might be associated with (moderately) different
plans. And some of these, especially use plans, but possibly others, may evolve and
change over time.
35 At first sight, this quotation might seem to contradict the idea of we-intentionality. But in my view
what Rothfeder is criticising here is the kind of teamwork based on blind conformism where there is
no scope for individual challenges to current thinking. From his account it is clear that once design
and engineering decisions are taken in a waigaya the team ethos of cooperation to pursue the agreed
objectives holds sway at Honda.
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Many artifactual kinds like chairs and coffee cups are described by ordinary
words in the language whose meaning is grasped by any competent speaker of the
language. In such cases, there are no alternative and partly conflicting ‘technical
meanings’. But technical terms, like ‘common-rail diesel engine’, can be familiar
to many language users without their having a complete grasp of their meaning.
Automotive engineers who have the requisite knowledge will normally agree on
the criteria needed to identify this type of engine andbe able to recognise onewhen
presentedwith a putative example. If not, we should conclude that they understand
the term in different ways.
This bears on our discussion of possible differences of opinion about the nature
of a new artifactual kind that is being developed. If two agents involved in the
process of producing a new artifact have irrevocably different conceptions about
the new artifactual kind K , then this difference should manifest itself in meaning
and language use. For example, they may not both acquiesce in calling the new
item a K and there would not be collective agreement over the use of this term.
Alternatively, they may both agree to use the term ‘K ’ while disagreeing on some
of its essential characteristics. Since, as Thomasson remarks, the intentionality of
the term may leave room for error and ignorance, it may also leave room for
different ways in which the concept may be developed and further determined
in the future. The characteristics for which the two agents disagree may simply
correspond to two different innovations and development paths for K . In this
case, we might say that the commonalities they currently share form part of the
collective intentionality that determines K at the current moment in time, while
the disagreements involve an understanding of K thatmaymanifest itself in future
choices about use. If divergences of views are sufficiently strong, and other suitable
conditions for innovation are met, we might have an example of an exaptive
process leading to a new or highly modified artifact kind.
8. Conclusions
Underlying these two singular characteristics of human culture –
cumulative artifacts and social institutions – are a set of species-unique
skills and motivations for cooperation. (Tomasello 2009)
Today, sociality and the forms of human cooperation are highly visible topics of
study inmany disciplines. Prominent among them are developmental psychology,
evolutionary anthropology and neuroscience. Philosophers of engineering and
design have proposed action-theoretic models of artifact creation and production
where planning and cooperation form pivotal concepts. Models of this kind
provide a valuable theoretical framework for the design sciences, especially for
the analysis of technology and its development. I have tried to show how one
such model in particular, that of Houkes & Vermaas (2009), can benefit from the
addition of group notions of agency, belief and collective intentionality that are
currently being studied in social ontology. I hope to have shown that this addition
goes someway to answer a hidden challenge raised by a prominent defender of the
intentionalist view of artifactual kinds in Thomasson (2014), namely to explain
adequately how collective artifacts can be understood to depend on collective
intentionality.36
36 I realise that this may not be a complete answer to Thomasson, as she would probably wish to see a
greater emphasis on the societal recognition of norms (Thomasson 2014).
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We have also seen that the engineering model focuses more on processes
that underlie the postconceptualisation phase of artifact creation and less on
the disruptive stages that lead up to innovation. The narrative model of Lane &
Maxfield (2005) is one approach that addresses the preconceptualisation stage
within an organisational setting. Even when focusing on the disruptive stages,
this approach emphasises a number of preconditions for successful innovation
that should lead to strong forms of cooperation in the future. So we may look
upon such conditions as mutual and aligned directedness, permissions and action
opportunities as potential fertilisers for collective intentionality.
Reflecting on teamwork in design from the standpoint of group agency and
we-intentionality, we can summarise its main features in the following way:
(1) Considered as a group agent the team is a functional social action system
with the power to act (Tuomela 2013).
(2) As a group agent the team has derived intentionality.37
(3) Viewed in the we-mode sense, the intentional properties of the group or team
are emergent with respect to the properties of its members individually.
(4) Viewed in the we-mode, the team shares group agreed plans, goals and
intentions.
(5) Personal opinions and beliefs may differ among members; however, group
beliefs, goals and plans are communicated among members and transmitted
to other actors.
As an explanatory tool for the design sciences, the concepts of group agency
and group attitudes may be useful to understand different types of cooperation
and group behaviour. As one example, we have seen how, with the help of
these concepts, one may grasp how individualism and even nonconformism at
a personal level of beliefs can be compatible with a strong, we-mode form of
collectivity at a group or team level.
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